Group Decision Experiments

From OBTnotes

• Group and decision experiments in economics and psychology
• Professor Roberto Weber

Contents 1 Articles 1.1 Introduction 1.2 Experimental methodology and incentives 1.3 Markets & auctions 1.4 Fairness, division of welfare, and public goods 1.4.1 Individual Allocation 1.4.2 Group Allocation 1.5 Bounded Rationality 1.6 Heuristics, biases, and tests of expected utility 1.6.1 Preference Reversals 1.6.2 Ambiguity Aversion 1.6.3 Overconfidence 1.6.4 Hindsight bias & curse of knowledge 1.6.5 General 1.7 Coordination Problems 1.8 Bargaining & negotiation 1.9 Trust 1.10 Social Influence 1.11 Production/performance and Incentives 1.12 Field Experiments

Articles

(from the Spring 08 syllabus)

Introduction

• Hertwig, R. and A. Ortman. 2001. “Experimental practices in economics: A methodological challenge for psychologists.” Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 24: 383-451.
• Bonetti, S. 1998. “Experimental Economics and Deception,” Journal of Economic Psychology, 19(3): 377-395 Science Direct
• Hey, John D. 1998. “Experimental Economics and Deception: A Comment,” Journal of Economic Psychology, 19(3): 397-401. Science Direct
• McDaniel, Tanga, and Chris Starmer. 1998. “Experimental Economics and Deception: A Comment,” Journal of Economic Psychology, 19(3): 403-409.
• Bonetti, S. 1998. “Experimental Economics and Deception: Response,” Journal of Economic Psychology, 19(3): 411-414.
• Jamison, J., D. Karlan and L. Schechter. 2006. “To deceive or not to deceive: The effect of deception on behavior in future laboratory experiments.” Working paper available
• Optional
  • Rabin, M. 1998. “Psychology and economics.” Journal of Economic Literature, 36(1):11-46. JSTOR
  • Hertwig, R. and A. Ortmann. 2002. “Deception in experiments: The costs of an alleged method of last resort.” Working paper
  • Loomes, G. 1999. “Experimental Economics: Introduction,” Economic Journal, 109(453): F1-4
  • Starmer, C. 1999. “Experimental Economics: Hard Science or Wasteful Tinkering?” Economic Journal, 109(453): F5-15.
  • Loewenstein, G. 1999. “Experimental Economics from the Vantage-Point of Behavioural Economics,” Economic Journal, 109(453): F25-34.
  • Roth, A. E. 1995. “Introduction to experimental economics.” In The Handbook of Experimental Economics, eds. J. H. Kagel and A. E. Roth. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
  • Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences. 2002. “Foundations of behavioral and experimental economics: Daniel Kahneman and Vernon Smith.”

Experimental methodology and incentives

• Smith, V. L. 1976. “Experimental economics: Induced value theory.” American Economic Review, 66(2): 274-279. JSTOR
• Camerer & Hogarth. 1999. “The effects of financial incentives in experiments: A review and capital-labor-production framework.” Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 19(1): 7-42.
• Smith, V. L., and J. M. Walker. 1993. “Monetary rewards and decision cost in experimental economics.” Economic Inquiry, 31: 245-261.
• Frank, Björn. 1998. “Good news for experimenters: subjects do not care about your welfare,” Economics Letters, 61(2): 171-174. Science-Direct
• Cummings, R. G., G. W. Harrison and E. E. Rutstrom. 1995. “Homegrown Values and Hypothetical Surveys: Is the Dichotomous Choice Approach Incentive-Compatible?” The American Economic Review, 85(1): 260-266. JSTOR
• Optional
  • Rydval, O. and A. Ortmann. 2004. “How financial incentives and cognitive abilities affect task performance in laboratory settings: An illustration.” Economics Letters, 85(3):315-320.
  • Berg, J. E., L. A. Daley, J. W. Dickhaut and J. R. O’Brien. 1986. “Controlling preferences for lotteries on units of experimental exchange.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 101: 281-306. JSTOR
  • Becker, G. M., M. H. DeGroot and J. Marschak. 1964. “Measuring utility by a single-response sequential method.” Behavioral Science, 9: 226-232.
  • Harrison, G. W., R. M. Harstad and E. E. Rutstrom. 2004. “Experimental Methods and Elicitation of Values.” Experimental Economics 7(2): 123-140.

Markets & auctions

• Smith, V. L. 1962. “An experimental study of competitive market behavior.” Journal of Political Economy, 70: 111-137. JSTOR
• Kagel, J. H. and D. Levin. 1986. “The winner’s curse and public information in common value auctions.” The American Economic Review, 76: 894-920. JSTOR
• Bazerman, M. and W. Samuelson. 1983. “I won the auction but don’t want the prize.” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 27: 618-634. JSTOR
• Ku, G., Galinsky, A. D., & Murnighan, J. K. 2006. “Starting low but ending high: A reversal of the anchoring effect in auctions.” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 90: 975-986.
• Optional
  • Plott, C. R. and V. L. Smith. 1978. “An experimental examination of two exchange institutions.” Review of Economic Studies, 45: 133-153. JSTOR
  • Cox, J. C., B. Roberson and V. L. Smith. 1982. “Theory and behavior of single object auctions.” In Research in Experimental Economics, ed. V. L. Smith. Greenwich, CN: JAI Press.
  • Kagel, J. H. and D. Levin. 1993. “Independent private value auctions: Bidder behavior in first-, second-, and third-price auctions with varying numbers of bidders.” The Economic Journal, 103: 868-879. JSTOR
  • Kagel, J. H. 1995. “Auctions: A survey of experimental research.” In The Handbook of Experimental Economics, eds. J. H. Kagel and A. E. Roth. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
  • Friedman, Daniel. 1984. “On the Efficiency of Experimental Double Auction Markets,” American Economic Review, 74(1): 60-72. JSTOR

Fairness, division of welfare, and public goods

Individual Allocation

• Yaari, M. and M. Bar-Hillel. 1984. “On dividing justly.” Social Choice and Welfare, 1: 1-24.
• Hoffman, McCabe, Shachat & Smith. 1994. “Preferences, property rights and anonymity in bargaining games.” Games and Economic Behavior, 7: 346-380.
• Charness, G. and M. Rabin. 2002. “Understanding social preferences with simple tests.” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 117(3): 817-869. Available through Ingenta.
• Diekman, K., S. Samuels, L. Ross and M. Bazerman. 1997. “Self-interest and fairness in problems of resource allocation: Allocators versus recipients.” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 72(5): 1061-1074.
• Optional
  • Cappelen, Hole, Sorensen and Tungodden. “The Pluralism of Fairness Ideals: An Experimental Approach,” American Economic Review, volume 97, 2007.
  • Fisman, R., S. Kariv and D Markovits. 2007. “Individual Preferences for Giving.” The American Economic Review 97(5): 1858-1876.
  • Engelmann, Dirk & Martin Strobel, 2004. "Inequality Aversion, Efficiency, and Maximin Preferences in Simple Distribution Experiments," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(4), pages 857-869, September.
  • Small, D. A. and G. Loewenstein. 2003. "Helping 'A' victim or helping 'THE' victim: Altruism and Identifiability." Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 26(1): 5-16.
  • Earley, P. and E. Lind. 1987. “Procedural justice and participation in task selection: The role of control in mediating justice judgments.” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 52(6): 1148-1160
  • Konow, J. 2003. “Which is the fairest one of all? A positive analysis of justice theories.” Journal of Economic Literature, 16: 1188-1239.
  • Camerer, 2003. “Dictator, Ultimatum, and Trust Games.” Chapter 2 in Behavioral Game Theory: Experiments in Strategic Interaction. Princeton University Press.
  • Dana, J., R. Weber and X. Kuang. 2007. “Exploiting ‘moral wriggle room’: Experiments demonstrating an illusory preference for fairness.” Economic Theory 33(1): 67-80.
  • Andreoni, J. and J. H. Miller. 2002. “Giving according to GARP: An experimental test of the consistency of preferences for altruism.” Econometrica, 70: 737-753.

Group Allocation

• Dawes, R. M., J. McTavish and H. Shaklee. 1977. “Behavior, communication, and assumptions about other people’s behavior in a commons dilemma situation.” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 35: 1-11.
• Isaac, R. M. and J. Walker. 1988. “Group size effects in public goods provision: The voluntary contribution mechanism.” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 103: 179-199. JSTOR.
• Houser, Daniel and Robert Kurzban. 2002. “Revisiting Kindness and Confusion in Public Goods Experiments.” The American Economic Review, 92(4): 1062-1069.
• Fehr, E. and S. Gachter. 2000. Cooperation and punishment in public goods experiments. American Economic Review, 90(4): 980-994. JSTOR.
• Optional
  • Page, Talbot, Louis Putterman and Bulent Unel. (2005). “Voluntary Association in Public Goods Experiments: Reciprocity, Mimicry and Efficiency.” The Economic Journal 115 (506), 1032–1053.
  • Frank, Robert H., Thomas Gilovich, and Dennis T. Regan. 1993. “Does Studying Economics Inhibit Cooperation?,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 7: 159-171
  • Ross, L. and A. Ward. 1996. “Naive realism: Implications for social conflict and misunderstanding.” In Values and Knowledge, eds., T. Brown, E. Reed and E. Turiel. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
  • Gifford, R. 1982. Children and the commons dilemma. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 12, 269-280
  • Andreoni, J. 1995. "Cooperation in Public Goods Experiments: Kindness or Confusion? American Economic Review, v.85, no.4: 891-904. JSTOR.
  • Andreoni, James. 1995. “Warm-glow versus cold-prickle: The effects of positive and negative framing on cooperation in experiments,” Quarterly Journal of Economics,110(1): 1-21. JSTOR.
  • Isaac, R. M., K. McCue and C. Plott. 1985. “Public goods provision in an experimental environment.” Journal of Public Economics, 26: 51-74.
  • Ledyard, J. O. 1995. “Public goods: A survey of experimental research.” In The Handbook of Experimental Economics, eds. J. H. Kagel and A. E. Roth. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Bounded Rationality

• Wason, P. C. 1968. “Reasoning about a rule.” Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 20: 273-281.
• Griggs, R. & S. Jackson. 1990. “Instructional effects on responses in Wason's selection task.” British Journal of Psychology 81:197-204.
• Johnson, Eric J.; Colin F. Camerer; Sanker Sen; and Talia Rymon. 2002. “Detecting failures of backward induction: Monitoring information search in sequential bargaining.” Journal of Economic Theory, 104(1). First Search
• Optional
  • Shafir, E. and A. Tversky. 1992. “Thinking through uncertainty: Nonconsequential reasoning and choice.” Cognitive Psychology, 24: 449-474.
  • Xavier Gabaix & David Laibson & Guillermo Moloche & Stephen Weinberg, 2006. "Costly Information Acquisition: Experimental Analysis of a Boundedly Rational Model," American Economic Review, vol. 96(4), pages 1043-1068
  • V. Crawford, M. Costa-Gomes and B. Broseta. 2001. "Cognition and Behavior in Normal-Form Games: An Experimental Study" Econometrica 69: 1193-1235.
  • Miguel A. Costa-Gomes and Vincent P. Crawford, "Cognition and Behavior in Two-Person Guessing Games: An Experimental Study," American Economic Review 96 (December 2006), 1737-1768

Heuristics, biases, and tests of expected utility

Preference Reversals

• Lichtenstein S and P. Slovic. 1971. “Reversals of preference between bids and choices in gambling decisions.” Journal of Experimental Psychology, 89: 46-55.
• Lichtenstein S. and P. Slovic. 1973. “Response-induced reversals of preferences in gambling: An extended replication in Las Vegas.” Journal of Experimental Psychology, 101: 16-20.
• Grether, D. M. and C. R. Plott, 1979. “Economic theory of choice and the preference reversal phenomenon.” The American Economic Review, 69(4): 623-638. JSTOR.
• Hsee, Christopher. 1996. “The evaluability hypothesis: An explanation for preference reversals between joint and separate evaluations of alternatives.” Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 67(3): 247-257.
• Optional
  • Zikmund-Fisher, B., A. Fagerlin and P. A. Ubel. 2004. “’Is 28% good or bad?’ Evaluability and preference reversals in health care decisions.” Medical Decision Making, 24(2): 142-148.
  • Ariely, D., G. Loewenstein and D. Prelec. 2003. “Coherent arbitrariness: Stable demand curves without stable preferences.” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118: 73-106.
  • Berg, J. J. W. Dickhaut and T. A. Rietz. “Preference reversals: The impact of truth-revealing incentives.” Working paper.

Ambiguity Aversion

• Curley, S. P, J. F. Yates and R. A. Abrams. 1986. “Psychological sources of ambiguity avoidance.” Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 38:230-256.
• Sarin R. K. and M. Weber. 1993. “Effects of ambiguity in market experiments.”Management Science, 39: 602-615. JSTOR.
• Ming Hsu, Meghana Bhatt, Ralph Adolphs, Daniel Tranel, Colin F. Camerer. 2005. “Neural Systems Responding to Degrees of Uncertainty in Human Decision-Making.” Science 310(5754): 1680-1683.
• Optional
  • Fox C. and A. Tversky. 1995. “Ambiguity aversion and comparative ignorance.” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 110: 585-603. JSTOR.
  • Chow, Clare Chua and Rakesh Sarin. 2002. “Known, unknown, and unknowable uncertainties.” Theory and Decision, 52(2): 127-138.

Overconfidence

• Weinstein, N. 1980. “Unrealistic optimist about future life events.” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 39: 806-820.
• Camerer, C. and D. Lovallo. 1999. “Overconfidence and excess entry: An experimental approach.” The American Economic Review, 89(1): 306-318. JSTOR.
• Moore, D. A. & Small, D. A. 2007. “Error and bias in comparative judgment: On being both better and worse than we think we are.” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 92(6): 972-989.
• Optional
  • PJ Healy, DA Moore. 2006. Bayesian overconfidence: Theory and experiments. Working paper
  • Winston R. Sieck, Hal R. Arkes. 2005. “The recalcitrance of overconfidence and its contribution to decision aid neglect.” Journal of Behavioral Decision Making 18(1): 29-53.
  • Moore, D. A., & Kim, T. G. 2003. “Myopic social prediction and the solo comparison effect.” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 85(6), 1121-1135.
  • Alpert, M. and H. Raiffa. 1959. “A progress report on the training of probability assessors.” Reprinted in Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases. 1982. Eds. D. Kahneman, P. Slovic, and A. Tversky. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
  • Svenson, Ola. “Are we all less risky and more skillful than our fellow drivers?” Acta Psychologica, 47: 143-148.

Hindsight bias & curse of knowledge

• Fischhoff, B. 1975. “Hindsight ≠ foresight: The effect of outcome knowledge on judgment under uncertainty.” Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 104: 288-299.
• Camerer, C., Loewenstein, G. and Weber, M. 1989. “The curse of knowledge in economic settings: An experimental analysis.” The Journal of Political Economy, 97:1232-1254. JSTOR
• Optional
  • George Loewenstein, Don A. Moore and Roberto A. Weber. (2006). “Misperceiving the value of information in predicting the performance of others.” Experimental Economics 9(3):281-295.
  • Hoffrage, U., R. Hertwig and G. Gigerenzer. 2000. “Hindsight bias: A by-product of knowledge updating?” Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory and Cognition, 26(3): 566-581.

General

• Kahneman, D. and A. Tversky. 1979. “Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk.” Econometrica, 47: 263-292. JSTOR
• Charles R Plott and Kathryn Zeiler. 2005. “The Willingness to Pay-Willingness to Accept Gap, the ‘Endowment Effect,’ Subject Misconceptions, and Experimental Procedures for Eliciting Valuations.” The American Economic Review 95(3), p. 530.
• Optional
  • Tversky, A. and D. Kahneman. 1992. “Advances in Prospect Theory: Cumulative representation of uncertainty.” Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 5: 297-323.
  • Harrison, G. W. 1994. “Expected utility theory and the experimentalists.” Empirical Economics, 19: 223-253.
  • Camerer, C. F. 1995. “Individual decision making.” In The Handbook of Experimental Economics, eds. J. H. Kagel and A. E. Roth. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
  • Conlisk, J. 1989. “Three variants on the Allais example.” The American Economic Review, 79: 392-407. JSTOR.

Coordination Problems

• Mehta, Starmer & Sugden. 1994. “The nature of salience: An experimental investigation of pure coordination games.” American Economic Review, 84: 658-673. JSTOR.
• Gwen Wittenbaum, Garold Stasser and Carol Merry. 1996. “Tacit Coordination in Anticipation of Small Group Task Completion.” Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, Volume 32, Issue 2, March 1996, Pages 129-152
• Van Huyck, Battalio and Beil. 1990. “Tacit coordination games, strategic uncertainty,and coordination failure.” American Economic Review, 80: 234-248. JSTOR.
• Optional
  • Roberto A. Weber. (2006). “Managing growth to achieve efficient coordination in large groups.” The American Economic Review 96(1):114-126.
  • Weber, R. and Camerer, C. (2003). “Cultural conflict and merger failure: An experimental approach.” Management Science 49(4): 400-415.
  • Bacharach and Bernasconi. 1997. “The variable frame theory of focal points: An
  • Van Huyck, Battalio, and Beil. 1991. “Strategic uncertainty, equilibrium selection, and coordination failure in average opinion games.” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 106:885-910. JSTOR.
  • Van Huyck, Gillette, and Battalio. 1992. “Credible assignment in coordination games.”Games and Economic Behavior, 4: 606-626.
  • Krauss, R. M. & Weinheimer, S. 1966. Concurrent feedback, confirmation, and the encoding of referents in verbal communication. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 4: 343-346
  • Clark, H. and D. Wilkes-Gibbs. 1986. “Referring as a collaborative process.” Cognition, 22: 1-39.

Bargaining & negotiation

• Ochs and Roth. 1989. “An experimental study of sequential bargaining.” American Economic Review, 79: 355-384. JSTOR.
• Moore, Don. 2004. “The unexpected benefits of final deadlines in negotiation. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 40: 121-127.
• Babcock, Loewenstein, Issacharoff, Camerer. 1995. “Biased judgments of fairness in bargaining.” American Economic Review, 85(5): 1337-1343. JSTOR.
• Babcock & Loewenstein. 1997. “Explaining Bargaining Impasse: The Role of Self-Serving Biases” The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 11(1): 109-126. JSTOR.
• Optional
  • Chertkoff, J., and J. Esser. 1976. “A review of experiments in explicit bargaining,”Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 12: 464-486.
  • Messick, D. M., Moore, D. A., & Bazerman, M. H.. 1997. “Ultimatum bargaining with a group: Underestimating the importance of the decision rule.” Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 69(2): 87-101.
  • Kahneman, Daniel, Jack L. Knetsch, and Richard Thaler. 1986. “Fairness as a Constraint on Profit Seeking: Entitlements in the Market,” American Economic Review, 76:728-741.
  • Murnighan, J. Keith, and M. S. Saxon. 1998. “Ultimatum Bargaining by Children and Adults,” Journal of Economic Psychology, 19(4): 415-445.
  • Babcock and Loewenstein. 1997. “Explaining bargaining impasse: The role of self-serving biases.” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 11(1): 109-126.
  • Johnson, Camerer, Sen & Rymon. 2002. “Detecting Failures of Backward Induction: Monitoring Information Search in Sequential Bargaining.” Journal of Economic Theory, 104(1): 16-47
  • Moore, D. “Myopic prediction, self-destructive secrecy, and the unexpected benefits of revealing final deadlines in negotiation.”
  • Roth, A. E. 1995. “Bargaining experiments.” In The Handbook of Experimental Economics, eds. J. H. Kagel and A. E. Roth. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Trust

• Berg, Dickhaut, McCabe. 1995. “Trust, reciprocity, and social history.” Games and Economic Behavior, 10.
• Kim, P. H., K. T. Dirks, C. D. Cooper and D. L. Ferrin. 2006. “When more blame is better than less: The implications of internal vs. external attributions for the repair of trust after a competence- vs. integrity-based trust violation.” Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 99(1): 49-65.
• Deutsch, Morton. 1958. Trust and Suspicion. The Journal of Conflict Resolution 2(4):265-279.
• Glaeser, E., D. Laibson, J. Scheinkman and C. Soutter. 2000. “Measuring trust.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 115(3): 811-846.
• Michael Kosfeld, Markus Heinrichs, Paul J. Zak, Urs Fischbacher and Ernst Fehr. 2005. “Oxytocin increases trust in humans.” Nature 435(7402): 673-676.
• Optional
  • Kim, P. H., D. L. Ferrin, C. D. Cooper, K. T Dirks. 2004. “Removing the shadow of suspicion: The effects of apology versus denial for repairing competence-versus integrity-based trust violations.” Journal of Applied Psychology, 89(1): 104-118. PsycInfo.
  • Cook, K. S., T. Yahagishi, C. Cheshire, R. Cooper, M. Matsuda and R. Mashima. 2005.“Trust building via risk taking: A cross-sectional experiment.” Social Psychology Quarterly 68(2): 121.
  • Jörn P. W. Scharlemann, Catherine C. Eckel, Alex Kacelnika and Rick K. Wilson. 2001. “The value of a smile: Game theory with a human face.” Journal of Economic Psychology 22(5): 617-640.
  • Pillutla, M. M, D. Malhotra and J. K. Murnighan. 2003. “Attributions of trust and the calculus of reciprocity.” Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 39(5): 448-455.
  • Dirks, K. T. 1999. “The effects of interpersonal trust on work group performance.” Journal of Applied Psychology, 84(3): 445-455. PsycInfo.
  • Buchan, Nancy R, Rachel T.A. Croson, and Robyn M. Dawes. “Swift Neighbors and Persistent Strangers: A Cross-Cultural Investigation of Trust and Reciprocity in Social Exchange.” American Journal of Sociology, Vol 108, Issue 1, July 2002, p. 168-206.

Social Influence

• Asch, S. E. 1956. "Studies of Independence and Conformity: A Minority of One Against a Unanimous Majority." Psychological Monographs 70(9)(No. 416): 70.
• Deutsch, M. N. Y. U. and Gerard, H. B. (1955). "A study of normative and informational social influences upon individual judgment." The Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology 51(3): 629-636.
• Cialdini, R., Reno, R. and Kallgren, C. (1990). "A Focus Theory Of Normative Conduct: Recycling The Concept Of Norms To Reduce Littering in Public Places."Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 58(6): 1015-1026.
• Bardsley, N. and R. Sausgruber. 2005. “Conformity and reciprocity in public good provision.” Journal of Economic Psychology 26: 664-681.
  • Robert E. Burnkrant; Alain Cousineau. 1975. “Informational and Normative Social Influence in Buyer Behavior.” The Journal of Consumer Research 2(3): 206-215.
  • Shang, J. and R. Croson. 2006. Field experiments in charitable contribution: The impact of social influence on the voluntary provision of public goods. Working paper.
  • Celen, B. and Kariv, S. 2004. "Observational Learning Under Imperfect Information." Games and Economic Behavior 47(1): 72-86.
  • Duffy, J. and Feltovich, N. (1999). "Does Observation of Others Affect Learning in Strategic Environments? An Experimental Study." International Journal of Game Theory 28(1): 131-52.

Production/performance and Incentives

• Lepper, M. P., & Greene, D., & Nisbett, R. E. 1973. Undermining children's intrinsic interest with extrinsic reward: A test of the "overjustification" hypothesis. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 28(1): 129-137.
• Nalbantian, Haig R. and Andrew Schotter. (1997). “Productivity Under Group Incentives: An Experimental Study.” The American Economic Review, Vol. 87, No.3, pp. 314-341
• Fehr, Ernst & Kirchsteiger, George & Riedl, Arno, 1993. "Does Fairness Prevent Market Clearing? An Experimental Investigation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 108(2), pages 437-59, May.
• Gneezy, Uri and List, John A (2006). Putting behavioral economics to work: Testing for gift exchange in labor markets using field experiments. Econometrica 74(5), 1365-1384.
• Optional
  • Fehr, Ernst and Goette, Lorenz (2007). Do workers work more if wages are high? Evidence from a randomized field experiment. American Economic Review. 97(1), 298-317.
  • Fehr, Ernst & Kirchsteiger, George & Riedl, Arno, 1993. "Does Fairness Prevent Market Clearing? An Experimental Investigation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 108(2), pages 437-59, May.
  • Fehr, Ernst, Kirchler, Rich, Weichbold, Andreas and Gachter, Simon (1998). When social norms overpower competition: Gift exchange in experimental labor markets. Journal of Labor Economics. 16(2), 324-351.
  • Elliott, Elaine S. and Carol S. Dweck. 1988. “Goals An Approach to Motivation and Achievement.” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology (54)1: 5-12.

Field Experiments

• Greenberg, J. 1990. “Employee theft as a reaction to underpayment inequity: The hidden cost of pay cuts.” Journal of Applied Psychology, 75: 561-568.
• Fredrickson, B. L. and D. Kahneman. 1993. “Duration neglect in retrospective evaluations of affective episodes.” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 65: 44-55.
• Redelmeier, D. A., J. Katz and D. Kahneman. 2003. “Memories of colonoscopy: A randomized trial.” Pain, 104(1-2): 187-194
• Bertrand, Marianne and Sendhil Mullainathan. 2004. “Are Emily and Greg More Employable than Lakisha and Jamal? A Field Experiment on Labor Market Discrimination.” The American Economic Review, 94(4): 991-1013
• Arkes, H. and C. Blumer. 1985. The psychology of sunk cost. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 35(1): 124-140
• List, John A. 2004. “Neoclassical Theory Versus Prospect Theory: Evidence from the Marketplace.” Econometrica 72(2): 615–625.
• N.Y. Times. September, 8 2001. “Scholar sets off gastronomic false alarm.”
• Harrison, Glenn. 2005. “Field Experiments and Control.” Research in Experimental Economics, 10: 17-50.
• Optional
  • List, J. A. 2001. “Do Explicit Warnings Eliminate the Hypothetical Bias in Elicitation Procedures? Evidence from Field Auctions for Sportscards.” The American Economic Review 91:5. (Dec., 2001), pp. 1498-1507.
  • Harrison, Glenn and John List. 2004. “Field experiments.” Journal of Economic Literature, 42(4): 1009-1055
  • Gneezy, Uri, and John A. List. “Putting Behavioral Economics to Work: Testing for Gift Exchange in Labor Markets Using Field Experiments,” Econometrica, (2006),September, 74(5): 1365-1384.
  • Gneezy, U., and A. Rustichini "A Fine is a Price," Journal of Legal Studies, 29(1):1-18.
  • Ortmann, A. 2003. “Field experiments in economics: Some methodological caveats.” Working paper.
  • Lucking-Reiley, D. 1999. “Using field experiments to test equivalence between auction formats: Magic on the internet.” The American Economic Review, 89: 1063-1080. JSTOR
  • Soetevent, A. 2004. Anonymity in giving in a natural context – An economic field experiment in thirty churches.
  • Camerer, C. F. 1998. “Can asset markets be manipulated? A field experiment with racetrack betting.” The Journal of Political Economy, 106: 457-482. JSTOR
  • Ortmann, A. 2003. Field experiments in economics: Some methodological caveats.
  • List, J. A. and D. Lucking-Reiley. 2000. “Demand reduction in multiunit auctions: Evidence from a sportscard field experiment.” The American Economic Review, 90: 961-972.
  • Bohm, P. 1994. “Behavior under uncertainty without preference reversal: A field experiment.” Empirical Economics, 19: 185-200.